PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
CA-2001-21 Buffer Overflow in telnetd
release date: July 24, 2001
Last revised: --
revision history can be found at the end of this file.
running versions of telnetd derived from BSD source.
program is a server for the Telnet remote virtual terminal
protocol. There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet
daemons derived from BSD source code. This vulnerability can crash the
server, or be leveraged to gain root access.
is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet daemons
derived from BSD source code. During the processing of the Telnet
protocol options, the results of the "telrcv" function are
stored in a
fixed-size buffer. It is assumed that the results are smaller than the
buffer and no bounds checking is performed.
was discovered by TESO. An exploit for this
vulnerability has been publicly released; internal testing at CERT/CC
confirms this exploit works against at least one target system. For
more information, see
can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
telnetd process, typically root.
A contains information from vendors who have provided
information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we
receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the
CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
access to the Telnet service (typically port 23/tcp) using a
firewall or packet-filtering technology.
a patch can be applied, you may wish to block access to the
Telnet service from outside your network perimeter. This will limit
your exposure to attacks. However, blocking port 23/tcp at a network
perimeter would still allow attackers within the perimeter of your
network to exploit the vulnerability. It is important to understand
your network's configuration and service requirements before deciding
what changes are appropriate.
A. - Vendor Information
contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable. Patches are available
via our web site at http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/patches and
via ftp at ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/support/patches as soon as testing
has been completed.
IOS does not appear to be vulnerable. Certain non-IOS products
are supplied on other operating system platforms which themselves may
be vulnerable as described elsewhere in this CERT Advisory. The Cisco
PSIRT is continuing to investigate the vulnerability to be certain
and, if necessary, will provide updates to the CERT and publish an
advisory. Cisco Security Advisories are on-line at
versions of FreeBSD are vulnerable to this problem, which
was fixed in FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE and FreeBSD 3.5.1-STABLE on July 23,
2001. An advisory has been released, along with a patch to correct the
vulnerability and a binary upgrade package suitable for use on FreeBSD
4.3-RELEASE systems. For more information, see the advisory at the
an FTP mirror site from the following URL:
issue is] actively under investigation to determine
currently investigating and have confirmed that one can make
the in.telnetd daemon dump core but Sun has not yet determined if this
issue is potentially exploitable on Solaris.
B. - References
Coordination Center thanks TESO, who published an advisory on
this issue. We would also like to thank Jeff Polk for technical
Jason A. Rafail, Ian A. Finlay, and Shawn V. Hernan.
is available from:
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
and other security information are available from
our web site
to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to email@example.com. Please include in the body of your
and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
July 24, 2001: Initial release
Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----